State Failures in KwaZulu-Natal Floods

The floods that occurred in Durban/eThikwini and surrounding areas during the 2nd week of April 2022 could have been predicted by any city planner or metro official. Extensive research findings on South Africa’s coastal areas’ vulnerabilities to extreme precipitation and consequent flooding exists in the public domain. In the wake of the 2007, 2012, 2017 and 2019 flooding episodes in the same region of the country, adequate measures should have been taken to prevent, or for the very least minimise the social and economic effect of these natural disasters. This was not done, with the inevitable catastrophic results that tens of thousands of residents of the region must deal with.

As with many issues related to modern day neo-liberal governance, South Africa has a National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS). In line with this strategy, a document entitled the National Coastal Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment has been produced. Part of this vulnerability assessment is the reality that 40% of South Africans live within 60km of the coast; 20% (approximately 10 million people) live in coastal areas. Approximately 60% of the country’s economy depends on coastal natural resources and trade infrastructure such as ports. (M. Luck-Vogel et al. 2020: National Coastal Assessment for South Africa: Situational Assessment Report.)

What type of measures and policies, approved and implemented by affected KZN municipalities (specifically the eThekwini/Durban metro), aggravated the situation? Amongst others were the clearance of vegetation in areas/sites by property developers. Large areas were exposed to flood waters. Also, there has been poor planning relating to and including the upgrading of ageing infrastructure. Municipalities showed disregard to the construction of shacks in areas (riverbanks) that are prone to mudslides and flooding. Poorly maintained sewerage systems and the expansion of hard surfaces leading to greater run-off completes the picture.

Planning for disasters, or disaster in planning?
In the wake of the April floods in eThekwini/Durban, the obvious question to pose is: what organised social, political undertakings and structures are required to prevent these extreme weather events from having the impact they have had? In other words, how do we organise ourselves at government and civil society level to cope with these disasters? The need to pose this question becomes abundantly clear when considering the shambolic and downright criminal under and non-performance of the state authorities at local, provincial as well as national level. These parties and individuals have for many years paved the way for calamitous events such as these floods to occur. And recur. Municipalities, provincial governments, COGTA and associated organisations like SALGA are all in one way or the other, the main actors in governance. Their continued existence and mode of operation must be questioned, given their clearly demonstrated ineptitude in the handling and resolution of disasters such as these.

The Parliamentary Monitoring Group reported (SA Parliament, 5 March 2019) that the KZN provincial government spent only 41% of funds as part of the Urban Settlements Development Grant (USDG) that was available to it in that financial year. Worse still, no funds were allocated, or repairs done in the wake of the 2019 flood damage. The 2022 flood devastation has thus far affected 121 687 people, from 17 438 households and left 461 dead. (Business Day Online, 13 June 2022). An estimated 4000 plus homes were destroyed; 8000 homes were damaged.

News reports shed some light on the funding that would become available for immediate relief. R144 million from the provincial disaster response grant; R371 million from the municipal disaster response grant and a further R501 m in the form of provincial and municipal emergency housing grants. (Sunday Times, 22 May 2022). This amounts to approximately R1 billion. These funds, once used by the provincial and municipal governments are to be reimbursed by national treasury to the lower government levels; they are also expected to apply for these funds. Applications are handled by the National Disaster Management Centre (NMDC). Two months after the disaster, the finance minister is on record as saying that no such applications have been received. An obvious question to ask is, what is the purpose of provincial government structures if funding allocations from national treasury are meant for direct use by metros or local and district municipalities? Demands for their elimination must be part of a broader campaign against the SA constitution with all its anti-poor and anti-worker provisions. An amount of R25 billion as a final cost for reparations is being thrown around by the KZN premier. With its austerity programme and the routine looting of state funds we can rightfully question the authenticity of the reparation programme.

FORWARD WITH DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL RESOURCES